Introduction
It is well established that wording must be interpreted in the light of their context being "the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose and, within limits, its background…" [one] must have regard to the context in which the words of the section occur even though… the words themselves appear to be clear and unambiguous… the emerging trend in statutory construction is to have regard to the context in which the words occur even where the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous. This "technique" is now required by the Constitution, in particular by section 39(2).
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It appears customary in secondary sources to initiate any discussion on section 417
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 2 with the word "draconian". 3 Consulting a dictionary one is informed that "draconian" relates to, or is characteristic of, Draco or the severe code of laws held to have been framed by him. 4 Draco was an Athenian law scribe under whom small offences had heavy punishments, and thus the perception appears to be that the provisions of section 417 are overly harsh and that the potential scope of the provision is disproportionate to the rationale for which it was enacted. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that section 417, although  Yvette Joubert. BA LLB (Wits) LLM (UJ). Lecturer in Private Law, University of Johannesburg. Email: yjoubert@uj.ac.za. This is a reworked article based on the LLM study of Y Joubert entitled "Section 417 of the Companies Act 1973 " (LLM -dissertation UJ 2012 .
wide in ambit, 5 does not offend our sense of justice and fairness, and that it therefore deserves to remain part of the future South African insolvency law regime. 6 This article deals with the question of whether or not section 417 is adequately framed in order to fulfill its intended purposes in South African insolvency law. As stated in the quotation above, the current trend is to interpret legislation with reference to its context, ie the scope and purpose of such legislation, and thus the study is aimed at a policy evaluation. The intention is to determine whether section 417 conforms to the underlying values and interests that it was designed to serve and whether the outcome is advantageous to society.
The reason for focusing on section 417 is based on the unique and inquisitorial nature of the section, which jars with our sense of justice and seems a curious inclusion in a predominantly adversarial system. A section which allows for a witness to be summoned ex parte, where such person has no access to the application and cannot compel the discovery of documents, nor has access to the enquiry itself or the record of it, does indeed seem draconian in our modern age of constitutionalism and in the face of modern legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
7
Although the scrutiny of private examinations is not novel, it is felt that further exploration of the subject is justified by virtue of the fact that robust and innovative legislative changes have been seen in the South African corporate landscape. The section has already been tested and found to be lawful and constitutional, 8 but the 5 Reference is made to the word "any" five times in s 236(1). In Huang v Bester para 17 Satchwell J points out that the word "any" in s 236 "offers the most open-ended and far-reaching enumeration…which it is possible to describe". 6 In the early nineties the South African Law Reform Commission embarked on an extensive study 123. 7 Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 8.5.2 notes that a witness is entitled to a copy of the record of his own evidence at his own cost. 8 Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 8.5.2, where it is noted that save for part of s 417(2)(b), all provisions of s 417 and 418 are not constitutionally invalid. See further Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC), hereafter referred to as "Bernstein" or "Bernstein v Bester". The provision of s 417(2)(b) that "any answer given to any such question may thereafter be used in evidence aim is to ascertain whether the section serves a legitimate purpose and is necessary in a democratic society. A further impetus to this study was the judgment of Kebble v Gainsford, 9 which again brought section 417 to the fore and thus prompted a more in-depth investigation of the nature, scope and objectives of the section. The court concluded in Kebble that the circumstances of that matter clearly indicated the need for private investigation by the liquidators and the judgment is therefore a positive affirmation for the continued demand for investigations of this nature. The Kebble judgment is not critically analysed, as such an analysis would not aid a deeper understanding of section 417, but the approach taken by the court in the matter in lucidly setting out the nature, scope and purpose of the section is utilized as a springboard for this investigation. In short, the question asked in this article is whether or not section 417 is adequately framed in its current format in order to fulfill its intended purpose in South African insolvency law.
In Part 2 the law applicable to South African private examinations is considered. The primary source is section 417 of the Companies Act. Secondary sources include academic texts and judicial interpretation, in particular the matter of Kebble v Gainsford.
10 Part 3 comprises a comparative study, albeit very brief and condensed, taking a look at a similar provision in the Insolvency Act of the United Kingdom, namely section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986. 11 England is chosen as a source of comparison because much South African insolvency law emanates from England. 12 Further, the decision was prompted by the Kebble judgment itself, which refers to English cases that are seminal in this area of the law. Part 4 provides a comparison between the two systems for the purpose of identifying areas where South African against him" is constitutionally invalid with effect from 27 April 1994, in relation only to criminal proceedings other than those mentioned in the text, see Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC), hereafter referred to as "Ferreira v Levin".
law may benefit from reform, and concludes with suggestions for appropriate reform.
South African law

Introduction
The matter of Kebble v Gainsford is a useful vehicle for looking at the nature and purpose of a section 417 examination as the judgment contains extensive and constructive references to the various objectives of such an examination. 13 In his judgment Levenberg AJ relied heavily on the approach of the constitutional court in the matter of Bernstein v Bester, 14 where the constitutionality of section 417 and 418 was tested. Levenberg AJ finds himself in good company in his reliance on the Bernstein case, as this case has been embraced as a seminal decision on particularly the right to privacy, and in the approximately six years since the judgment it has been referred to in almost ninety High Court and Constitutional Court cases. 15 For the purposes of this article, the comments relating to sections 417 and 418 are of relevance. The court in Bernstein declared sections 417 and 418 to be constitutionally valid. The comments of Ackerman J relating to the objectives of a section 417 examination are of particular interest and these comments will therefore be used as a point of reference. To begin with, however, the facts of the Kebble matter are provided below.
The facts
The facts of the Kebble case are evident from the judgment and can be summarised as follows: The applicant, Kebble was faced with a summons compelling him to testify in a section 417 examination. He did not wish to be submitted to such an examination and brought an application for the proceedings to be set aside. Kebble was the sole surviving director of a company called BNC ("the company") prior to its liquidation. He openly admitted in an affidavit that the company had been used as a 2) The only reason the company was formed was for fraudulent purposes.
3) The company was hopelessly insolvent and the liquidators had a duty to enquire as to the causes of the company's failure. 4) The fraud that had been committed was of a complex nature requiring further examination. 5) The fact that Kebble was prepared to pay R30 million to bring the examination to an end showed that he was not a person without knowledge of the affairs of the company.
6) It was against public policy to permit an examinee to avoid a liquidator's examination through a settlement to which the liquidators were not a party. 7)
Kebble himself had conceded that there may be other legitimate claims against the company and the liquidators should be given the opportunity to investigate such claims. 8) As long as there were outstanding claims against the company, the liquidators had a duty to pursue all potential assets. 9). The fact that the liquidators had carried out their own examinations and prepared the groundwork for the examination should not be used against them. If this were not so, liquidators would be prevented from ever preparing for enquiries, lest their diligence count against them.
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The court pointed out, further, that it was the duty of the court to protect examinees at an examination. If questions were asked that were abusive, the Commissioner, as an officer of the court, should disallow them. If the Commissioner's discretion was ex 21 Cloverbay Ltd (Joint Administrators) v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 1991 Ch 90 (hereafter referred to as "Cloverbay").
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Kebble v Gainsford 575G.
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Kebble v Gainsford 579A.
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Kebble v Gainsford 577C-578F.
The duties of a liquidator
As stated above, Levenberg AJ quoted extensively from the Bernstein matter, where Ackerman J summarised the major statutory duties of a liquidator in a winding-up. Ackerman J's summary is not provided, as it is in substance premised on the duties set out in the Companies Act, as discussed below. the creditors and contributories. This report has to be submitted no later than three months after the date of the liquidator's appointment to a general meeting of creditors and contributories of the company and has to set out, inter alia, the capital issued by the company, its estimated assets and liabilities, the causes of the failure of the company (if it had failed) and the progress and prospects of the winding-up.
30
Of significance is the fact that the liquidator has to note in this report whether or not further examination is in his opinion desirable in regard to any matter relating to the promotion, formation or failure of the company or the conduct of its business.
31
As stated above, the duties of a liquidator summarised by Levenberg AJ in the Kebble matter correspond in material respects to those set out in the Act. What needs to be considered next is to whom the liquidator owes such duties.
2.5
To whom does the liquidator owe these duties?
Although a company remains in existence during winding-up, it ceases from the commencement of the winding-up to carry on its business except in so far as may be required for the beneficial winding-up thereof, and its directors lose their powers except insofar as their continuance is sanctioned by the liquidator. 32 Whereas the business and affairs of the company up to that point are managed by or under the direction of its board, 33 who are accountable to the body of shareholders as a whole, the focus changes on winding-up to the benefit of creditors. It must be noted, …whatever his status he stands in a fiduciary relationship both to the company of which he is the liquidator and to the body of its members as a whole, as well as to the body of its creditors as a whole.
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What turned out to be of greater importance in the James matter was the fact that the liquidator is expected to be detached, independent, impartial and even-handed in his dealings and must also be seen to be so. 44 This was considered to be particularly important when considering the "far-reaching machinery of interrogation" created by the Companies Act, giving rise to a sui generis procedure where the powers of the liquidator are "extraordinary and inquisitorial in nature".
45
The impartiality of a liquidator is a safeguard against the potential abuse of the examination procedure. Another disparity that one notices when examining the functions of the Master within the context of international standards is the lack of investigative powers of the Master relating to the cause of the insolvency. In most foreign jurisdictions the examination into the cause of insolvency, which also includes the behaviour of the insolvent prior to the sequestration of his estate, represents a major objective in the justification of these regulatory institutions. Customarily, the investigative process of insolvency law is also established as a public policy measure. Although the South African system hosts a strong interrogation procedure, the investigative powers of the Master are limited to the general enquiries afforded by the Act, which generally aims to obtain information on the financial affairs of the insolvent and the whereabouts of property. Being able to determine the cause of insolvency not only has the advantage of separating the bona fide insolvent from the person abusing the system, but in the context of law reform will also have substantial scientific and empirical value. where there is good cause for removal. Meskin further states that: "'Good cause', in this context, would include, it is submitted, misconduct of any kind not covered by any of the provisions of sections 373 or 379(1) of the Companies Act; but 'cause', it is submitted, should not be confined to misconduct or personal unfitness for office; it includes any conduct which is such that the Court is able to conclude that it would be to the advantage of all the persons interested in the winding-up that the removal should ensue, having regard to the true interests of the winding-up and the purpose for which the liquidator is appointed. However, see s 152(2) of the Insolvency Act, where the Act also makes provision for an inquiry to be instituted by the Master, whenever he is of the opinion that the insolvent, the trustee, or any other person is able to give information which he (the Master) considers desirable to obtain concerning the insolvent, his estate, the administration of his estate, or any claim or demand made against the estate (s 152 (2) That the purpose of the section is clear and unequivocal is substantiated by the fact that cases have consistently noted the purpose of the section in a similar manner.
This was again seen in the very recent matter of P Nyathi v M P Cloete, 59 where the court had to consider the purpose of section 417, and in doing so it referred to a number of cases that pronounced on the objects of the section 417. The purpose of this section was variously noted to be the following: to assist officers of the Court in performing their duty to creditors, the Master and the court, 60 to determine the most advantageous course to adopt in regard to the liquidation of the company, 61 to assist the liquidator with the primary goal of winding-up, which is to identify the assets and liabilities and to administer them to the advantage of the creditors, 62 to provide the company with information about its affairs, claims and liabilities which the company's officers fail or refuse to make available, 63 and to piece together information in order to assist the winding-up process. 64 In another recent matter, Kawie v The Master of the High Court, 65 it is simply noted that the purpose of the section is to investigate the affairs of the company. The overall tenet of these decisions is that the purpose of section 417 is to obtain information. These recent interpretations of the purposes The process ... is needed because of the difficulty in which the liquidator in an insolvent company is necessarily placed. He usually comes as a stranger to the affairs of the company which has sunk to its financial doom. In that process, it may well be that some of those concerned in the management of the company, and others as well, have been guilty of some misconduct or impropriety which is of relevance to the liquidation. Even those who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing may have motives for concealing what was done. In any case there are almost certain to be many transactions which are difficult to discover or to understand merely from the books and papers of the company. Accordingly the Legislator has provided this extra-ordinary process so as to enable the requisite information to be obtained. 
Responsibility to account
The last purpose of section 417 referred to by Ackerman J in the Bernstein matter comprises the responsibility of those who obtain funds from the public to account for how those funds were spent. 68 In another matter, Ferreira v Levin, Vryenhoek v Powell, 69 Sachs J stated as follows:
Company directors and other officials who appeal to the public for funds and engage in public commercial activity with the benefit of not being personally liable for company debts, cannot complain if they are subsequently called upon to account for their stewardship… Indeed, it would be ironical if crooked directors were more able to avoid submitting themselves to an examination than honest ones. Furthermore, when one considers the prevailing economic situation it seems crucial to maintain a section such as section 417 in order to counterbalance the prevalence of white-collar crime and fraud in our society. In the Bernstein matter, Ackerman J took judicial notice of "the particularly high crime rate…currently prevalent in South Africa", as well as the collapse and liquidation of companies that were of concern to the state, and noted that this gave added weight to the argument that liquidators should act efficiently, quickly and prudently with assets to protect the interests of creditors and the public at large. Again, in the matter of Mitchell v Hodes 78 it was highlighted that the honest conduct of companies was a matter of great public concern, requiring the exposure of dishonest conduct, especially since the liquidation is frequently the result of mismanagement involving fraud on the part of the directors and other officers of the company. 79 These persons are often the only ones to have details of the preliquidation business affairs of the company. It is especially in these cases that an exa 2.9 Aspects which safeguard against the abuse of the section 2.9.1 Balance of rights Unless the court or, as the case may be, the Master, were to direct otherwise, section 417 (7) operates to deny all persons access to the application and any documents accompanying it and to the examination or enquiry itself, the record of it, and to any books or papers produced at it. 80 In Merchant Shippers SA v Millman 81 the court stated that there was good reason for the preservation of secrecy, not only with regard to the examination, but also the application for the enquiry. The judge underlined that the motive for the enquiry was to enable the liquidator to seek and recover assets to the advantage of creditors. If the information regarding the application and the matters which were to be inquired were to be made public this would complicate the task of the liquidator considerably.
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It is submitted that the balance to be achieved between the giving of the information requested and possible hardship to the examinee goes to the heart of the purpose of section 417. 84 The court pointed out that where the information requested is fundamental to the winding-up process, the balance would clearly weigh in favour of an examination, but if the liquidator wanted to merely "dot the i's and cross the t's on a fairly clear claim" the balance would lie against him.
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Conceding that few cases will be this plainly weighted, it is noted that a court will have to exercise its discretion as to whether or not to order an examination. The court outlined certain guidelines for the exercise of such discretion, as follows:
The first consideration is that the purpose of the provisions is to enable the liquidator to reconstitute the state of knowledge to the company in order to make informed decisions. The purpose is not to place the company in a stronger position in civil litigation than it would have enjoyed in the absence of liquidation. Second, the appropriate strategy is not to require proof of the absolute need for information before an order of examination will be granted, but proof of a reasonable requirement of information. Third, the case for examination would be much stronger against officers or former directors of the company, who owe the company a fiduciary duty, than against third parties. Fourth, an order for oral examination is more likely to operate against an examinee than an order for the production of documents. The court is also likely to treat an application for the holding of a s 417 examination from an office holder, such as the liquidator, with more sympathy than it would treat a similar request from a contributor… 86 The court concluded by stating that a clear case of abuse had to be established before a discharge from a subpoena could be ordered. As stated above, Kebble failed to establish any abuse. On the contrary, it was found that this was a clear case where an examination was patently indicated, for the reasons set out above in the discussion of the judgment.
Applicants wishing to set aside an order in terms of section 417 must prove that the statutory balance does not protect them properly. It is the Master who determines the relevance of the documents requested and not the party seeking to prevent disclosure. documents, the court held that the relevance of the documents requested trumped the right to privacy. 89 The decision was premised on the balance between the harm to a person summoned to produce books or papers in his custody and the importance of the documents sought.
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In Mitchell's case the court was dealing with the aspect of self-incrimination. 91 The following was noted regarding the balance between oppression to the examinee and the need to obtain information:
To my mind, the inevitable tension between the rights of an examinee in section 417 proceedings (in particular, the broad right to a fair trial of an examinee who is also an accused person) and the indubitable public interest in the proper examination of corporate collapses, has been adequately and fairly balanced by the Constitutional Court by the introduction of a direct use immunity, and by making the use of derivative evidence at a subsequent criminal trial subject to the discretion of the trial judge (whose duty it is to ensure compliance with fair criminal trial standards). As long as enquiries of this nature have been permitted by legislation in this country, the courts have had the power to intervene in order to supervise the manner in which they have been conducted.
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The liquidator must apply his mind in order to determine if a legitimate purpose exists and that sufficient cause is made out for the enquiry to take place. Should he not do so, he runs the risk of the court's declaring that the enquiry amounts to an abuse of process. 101 However, a witness does not have a right to being given a list of questions prior to a section 417 hearing. 102 An opportunity should be given to the witness to consult the documents and to consider a reply, but it is not necessary for the directors themselves, as quickly as possible, as they may be the only sources of information as to the pre-liquidation affairs of the company. In the Nyathi matter there was a typical absence of information, a lack of financial documents and information of the insolvent company, and a lack of co-operation from the directors.
So little persuaded was the court that the application in the Nyathi matter was "ill conceived" that costs on a punitive scale were awarded against the applicants.
In is made to the Nyathi decision discussed above, where the court noted that written interrogatories are not appropriate in all cases and that there is a risk that necessary information which could be elicited by means of oral evidence may not be exposed.
Conclusion
It can be seen that section 417 must be interpreted in order to give effect to the liquidator's duties, namely to determine and realize as many assets as possible and to assist the Master to expose any offences, to determine if directors are to be disqualified, and to determine the cause of failure of the company, where applicable.
It is significant that the courts give the duty to collect assets more weight than any of the liquidator's other duties. In the Kebble matter the court raised the point that directors should have a duty to account to the public, but it is submitted that the main focus of the liquidator remains to collect and distribute assets. The wide discretion that the court has in terms of section 417 is balanced by a weighing of the interests of the parties and the fact that the court will not allow an abuse of process. It is important not to place too many checks and balances in a procedure based on discretion, as this may counter the very effectiveness of the section.
Comparison with English law
Introduction
This part contains the comparative aspect of the study and takes a concise look at the English provision for private examinations, namely section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986. 115 As has been noted above, South African insolvency law has a strong link to English insolvency law, as is evidenced by the seminal English cases that are still referred to and relied on by our courts, including the Constitutional Court, in reaching their decisions.
Section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986
Section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 116 regulates private examinations. According to this section the court may, on the application of the office holder, summon to appear before it any officer of the company, any person known or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or supposed to be indebted to the company or any person whom the court thinks capable of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, business, dealings, affairs or property of the company. 117 "Office holder" means the administrator, the administrative receiver, the liquidator or provisional liquidator, 118 but also has an extended meaning to include the official receiver.
119 For Rajak the most striking feature of the section is the fact 115 For the purpose of clarifying nomenclature it should be noted that English insolvency law makes provision for a number of regimes, including voluntary winding-up, winding-up by court, receivership, administration and voluntary arrangements, with the result that the insolvency practitioner may be variously referred to as an administrative receiver, administrator, nominee or supervisor, liquidator or provisional liquidator, the office holder, official receiver etc. I have not reduced these varying terms to a standard terminology such as "the practitioner", but have reproduced the nomenclature used in the act, the case or the text that I refer to without alteration.
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Hereafter referred to as the "Insolvency Act, 1986". 117 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 234 (2). that anyone can be summoned under it, provided that person is capable of giving information concerning the affairs of the company.
120
The onus of proving that the information is reasonably required rests on the office holder. His burden is eased by the fact that the court regards the views of the office holder with "a good deal of weight". 121 Factors which are relevant are the stage of the insolvency process, the importance of the information required and the purpose for which it is required, the proximity of the relationship between the respondent and the insolvent, whether the order is for an oral examination or an order to produce documents, self-incrimination, and the entitlement of a respondent to documents. 122 Finch notes that the power to examine is not designed to offer liquidators special advantages in ordinary litigation and should not be used oppressively. 
Scope of the application
The scope of section 236 is premised upon the discretion of the court. Sealy and Milman comment that the court's discretion under section 236 is unfettered, 124 yet circumscribed by the overriding requirements that the examination should be necessary in the interests of winding-up, and that it should not be oppressive or unfair to the respondent. 125 It has been noted that, in view of the fact that the legislature saw fit to award a discretion to the court in respect of private enquiries, it would be counterproductive to classify all the occasions upon which it may be proper to make an order. 126 The section has been held to be very useful and as such it was unnecessary and undesirable to limit its scope. 127 
Purpose of the examination
The case of British and Commonwealth Holdings 135 addressed the purpose of the section 236 examination. 136 The court approved the dictum of Buckley J in In Re Rolls Razor Ltd 137 to the effect that the purpose of the section is to obtain information that the liquidator, as a stranger to the company, may not be privy to.
138
The dictum of Buckley J was also referred to in the Kebble matter and is quoted above and will therefore not be repeated here. In summary, the purposes of the section as set out in the In re Rolls matter are as follows: to assist the office holder to "discover the truth", so that he complete his function as effectively and with little expense as possible, to put the affairs of the insolvent estate in order, to identify and recover assets and to discover facts surrounding potential claims, including claims against the potential respondent to the application. In the British & Commonwealth 139 matter counsel for the appellants summarized the purpose of the section as follows:
The office holder faces the obvious difficulty or disadvantage that he is a stranger to the company's affairs. This is the "mischief" at which section 236 is aimed: the section overcomes the difficulty or disadvantage by allowing the office holder to acquire (cheaply and, if appropriate, quickly) the knowledge that the company over which is he is appointed should possess. The section remedies disadvantage rather than confers advantage.
140
The above quotation is included here, as it is submitted that the formulation by counsel to the effect that section 236 does not confer additional advantages to a liquidator but rather redresses an imbalance that exists due to the fact that the liquidator is a stranger to the company aids our understanding of the true purpose of section 236. This aspect is addressed more fully below under the discussion of the duties of the official receiver.
Duties of the official receiver
An official receiver's duties are not confined to the determination of the assets of the company, but include an investigation of the affairs of the company. 142 Mayson notes that a person who is appointed as a practitioner in a company insolvency is usually unfamiliar with the company but must take charge of it very quickly, and the legislation therefore makes several provisions for information about the company to be provided to the practitioner. 143 One such provision is section 131 of the Insolvency Act. In terms of this provision the official receiver may require a person to submit a statement as to the affairs of the company. 144 The official receiver has the duty to investigate if the company has failed and also to investigate more generally the promotion, formation, business, dealings and affairs of the company and to make such a report as he thinks fit. 145 The official receiver has a discretion as to whether to 
Section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986
The official receiver is assisted in his duty by section 235 of the Insolvency Act, 1986 , which creates a duty to co-operate with the office-holder. 150 This section notes that each person mentioned in section 236 shall give to the office holder such information concerning the company and its affairs or property as the office holder may reasonably require, failing which a fine may be imposed. 151 No prescribed procedure is required in terms of section 235 and the office holder may merely contact the relevant person requesting his attendance or the information that he requires.
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In the matter of RGB Resources plc 153 it was held that section 236 should be read together with section 235, but it noted that section 235 contained a mandatory obligation on an officer to give the information reasonably required, whereas the court retained a discretion to order a private examination under section 236. 
3.7
The Insolvency Service
The insolvency practitioner does not act alone in the execution of his duties, but is regulated by The Insolvency Service, which is an executive agency within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 157 The Insolvency Service's functions include the authorisation and regulation of the insolvency profession, dealing with the disqualification of unfit directors, and providing information to the public when necessary. 158 There is also a Companies Investigations Branch which conducts confidential investigations into companies where it is in the public interest to do so.
The Company Directors Disqualification Act
Although no mention is made of the Directors Disqualification Act in section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986, these two measures should be read together. required to do by section 7(3) of the Companies Directors Disqualification Act. 162 The court concludes that these provisions are complementary to each other. Information obtained under section 236 may be of use for more than one purpose and the section should therefore not be interpreted narrowly.
Protection of the public interest and balancing interests
The case of Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd 163 introduces a further issue relevant to section 236, namely the public interest aspect of insolvencies. The court emphasized that the liquidator serves a public interest and not merely the financial interest of the creditors and contributories. The court referred to the report of the Cork Committee, 164 which observed that "The law of insolvency takes the form of a compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, his creditors and society". 165 As a result, the court pointed out, insolvency proceedings are not treated in English law as an exclusively private matter between the debtor and his creditor, as the interest of the community must be taken into account.
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Keay defines public interest as those interests which society has a regard for and which are wider than the interests of those parties directly involved in an insolvent matter. 167 He submits, however, that it is difficult to define the concept of the public interest and that there is no general consensus as to what the public interest involves. He concludes that it should not be assumed that the interests of the debtor and the creditors take preference over the public interest, nor should one say that the public interest is paramount. The correct approach is to consider all interests in each case, and to engage in a careful balancing exercise to determine which interests, based on the facts, should be preferred. It is possible to divide instances where the public interest is a factor in insolvency law into three very broad categories. First, it is in the public interest that insolvencies are resolved in an orderly and expeditious way. Second, it is in the public interest to ensure that commercial morality is enforced, so as, inter alia, to prevent fraud and improper practices.
169
This balance of interests is necessary to counter the wide discretion of the court in matters arising from section 236. 170 It has been held that the court must be astute to prevent any oppressive, vexatious or unfair use of the section. 171 The court must balance the needs of the liquidators with the potential oppression to the individuals.
In Re Castle New Homes Ltd 172 the court put it thus:
The court will always be concerned to avoid vexation, oppression or injustice in making an order under section 236. If the evidence shows that the purpose of a litigator in seeking the examination is to achieve an advantage beyond that available to the ordinary litigant, in litigation which he has already commenced or which he has definitely decided to commence, the predisposition of the court may well be to refuse an immediate order for examination, unless the liquidator can show special grounds to the contrary. If, however, it appears from the evidence that the object of the liquidator is simply to elicit information that will enable or assist him to decide whether or not his company has a valid claim against a third party, the court will approach the liquidator's application with no such predisposition. While it will still be anxious in such a case to avoid oppression, it will also bear in mind that one of the very purposes of section [236] is to enable the liquidator 'as effectively as possible and…with as little expense as possible and with as much expedition as possible… to complete his function as liquidator…; and that to assist him in this may inevitably involve giving him a degree of advantage which would not be available to an ordinary potential litigant.
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The above passage was quoted with approval in the matter of Cloverbay. In this matter the respondents were concerned that the administrator's true purpose was to obtain the documents so that they could be sold to a buyer as a part of a package to sell the development. It was submitted on their behalf that it was an abuse of the procedure under s 236 to seek from them the "fruits of their labours". The court found this to be a valid objection.
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Summary and recommendations
Comparison between the South African and the English procedures
The scope of application of a private examination is very wide. 178 In both South
Africa and England the procedure is unavailable in voluntary insolvency. In England the procedure is available in all other forms of insolvency, whereas the South African section refers to cases where a company is unable to pay its debts. This restriction is being eroded by our courts and has been made applicable to a company which was wound up on the basis that it was just and equitable to do so. 179 The interpretation of the court in doing so is commended and it is submitted that future legislation should do away with the requirement of a company's being "unable to pay its debts". As stated by the court in Huang, liquidators in all cases of winding-up face similar problems, and there appears to be no rational basis to make a procedure available to only certain types of winding-up. This interpretation is not an extension of the section beyond its original intention and as such should be countenanced.
The Master or the Court can instigate the procedure in South Africa on the assumption that there are instances where a secret examination without recourse to the court would benefit the winding-up process. 180 In terms of English law, the procedure can be instigated only by the court, and the office holder applies to the court to commence a private enquiry. In the interests of certainty, some thought needs to be given to the personae that are empowered to instigate a private examination in South African law. This matter is addressed below under the heading of "Reform". It is submitted that the private examination, premised as it is on discretion and balance, is one that is best confined to the court's examination. inquisitorial and the ordinary standards of trial procedure are not applicable. Both systems make use of discretion in order to balance the rights of examinees against the need for information.
In South African law the private examination is part of the administration process. In
English law it is held to be oppressive to proceed with a statutory examination if information or documentation has not been requested informally by letter or other means. English law therefore envisages that a statutory examination be seen as a last resort. Furthermore, although the procedure under section 236 is sometimes referred to as a "private examination" the court may make a range of other orders, including the production of witness statements or documents. It is submitted that the insolvency process in South Africa will be enhanced by an adoption of the English approach. This is discussed more fully under "Reform" below.
The general duties of the liquidator in South African law and an office holder under English law coincide in that both of them have the duty of recovering the assets of the company, paying the creditors, and distributing the surplus (if any) to the persons entitled to it. In English law the duties of an office holder are wider, including the duty to investigate the causes of a company's failure, to expose offences and to report on the grounds for recommending the disqualification of a director. This is an area where South African law is deficient, as discussed more fully below.
The liquidator is probably not an officer of the court in South African law, but what is more important is that the liquidator is seen to be independent and impartial in his dealings. 181 It is submitted that a statutory obligation on the liquidator to act in a fiduciary capacity towards the body of creditors as a whole will give clarity and credence to his position. This matter is therefore discussed under "Reform" below.
The insolvency practitioner is an officer of the court in the England, but there no evident benefit in following this practice in South African law. 
Recommendations
From the above discussion it can be seen that certain aspects pertaining to private examinations are ideal and should not be altered, such as the wide discretion of the court and the balance to be achieved between the rights of examinees and the needs of liquidators. Others are adequate, such as the provision for legal representation and access to information. Suggestions for reform are related to the following aspects of the private examination: who may instigate a private examination, using a public examination as a last resort, putting supportive measures and structures into place in order to scaffold the statutory foundation, encoding the fiduciary duties of liquidators, and extending the focus of a private examination.
Who may instigate a private examination?
In South Africa a private examination may be commenced by the Master or the Court. The Master's office is overburdened with duties. With particular reference to private examinations, the delegation of functions to a commissioner recognizes that the Master and the court are in need of assistance. It is submitted that delegation to a commissioner is treating the symptoms rather than eradicating the root of the problem. Instead of extending the power to instigate a private examination to the Master, and then attempting to ease his burden by making provision for delegation, it is submitted that a more realistic solution would be to limit the involvement of the Master altogether. In order to expand on this point of view, it is necessary to briefly consider reform to insolvency law in general, with reference to recent corporate reform in South Africa. In addition, the business rescue practitioner may be held liable in accordance with any relevant law for the consequences of any act or omission amounting to gross negligence in the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions of practitioner, although he is not liable for any act or omission made in good faith in the course of the exercise of his powers and the performance of his functions (s 140(3)(c)).
would likewise have the object of raising the standard of behaviour of insolvency practitioners and would provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient discharge of a practitioner's duties. These duties should be mandatory and unalterable. In the English system there is a structure of interwoven rules, regulations, codes and guidelines which augment the statutory basis of the insolvency law. This system of certainty, transparency, accessibility and predictability is one that should be emulated in our law.
Extending the focus of the liquidator's duties
A significant difference in focus between the South African and English systems is the fact that the official receiver is tasked with the duty not only to determine and realize the assets of the insolvent company, but also to investigate and report on the cause of the failure of the company. In South Africa the overarching purpose of the section has consistently been interpreted by our courts as being for the acquisition of information. South African insolvency law would be enhanced if the focus of the examination were to be extended to include an investigation into the cause of the failure of the company. There is a greater awareness of the interdependence between companies and the society in which they function, and there should be an increased responsibility in the insolvency process on the reasons why companies have failed.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted that far from being draconian, it is vital that section 417 be retained in a new insolvency regime. The accessibility of the section to liquidators, the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings, the wide scope of the section and the effective sanctions should examinees not comply together combine to make a formula that has over the years proved impervious to circumvention. The sheer regularity with which private examinations are sought to be challenged in our courts It is difficult to see why an insolvent who has made a clean breast and has nothing to hide should shirk an interrogation such as the one the applicant objects to... A person who is sequestrated effectively sacrifices his or her right to privacy in regard to, at the least, pre-sequestration patrimonial matters. The rights of a creditor enjoy preference over those of an insolvent...
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It is submitted that this section must remain part of our future insolvency legislation as it fulfills its function with prudent efficiency. This submission is strengthened by the fact that the Constitutional Court, after careful consideration, has kept sections 417 and 418 wholly intact, 199 with the exception of those parts that infringed on the rule of self-incrimination. Recommendations have been made in this article on aspects where the section may be enhanced by reform. In part, these recommendations rely on the premise that South African insolvency law in toto is desperately in need of an overhaul. Meaningful reform will include a re-evaluation of the Master's role, widening the scope of the liquidator's duties, and making it obligatory for liquidators to act honestly and impartially. Such measures will bring certainty and credibility which will hopefully help to counterbalance the resistance to the "draconian" private enquiry. process on the reasons why companies have failed. The accessibility of the section to practitioners, the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings, the wide scope of the section and the effective sanctions should examinees not comply together combine to make a formula that has over the years proved impervious to circumvention and it therefore fulfils its function with prudent efficiency. 
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